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We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very 
weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small 
redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium 
amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of 
contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to 
characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete 
way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ 
private contributions. 
1. Introduction 
A standard result of the theory of public goods is that, in general, pure 
public goods would be undersupplied by voluntary contributions. Neverthe- 
less, there appear to be many important instances in which pure public 
goods are voluntarily supplied. Aside from the obvious example of private 
donations to charity,’ the campaign funds of political parties and the 
political action funds of special interest groups are, to a large extent, financed 
by voluntary contributions. As Becker (1981) has pointed out, much of the 
economic activity of the family unit must be explained as the outcome of 
voluntary contributions. Kemp (1984a, 1984b) suggests applications of this 
theory to the issues of multilateral ‘foreign aid’ and of the provision of 
‘international public goods’. 
The first substantial contribution to the theory of voluntary provision of 
public goods of which we are aware was due to Olson (1965). Recently, there 
have been several interesting theoretical discussions of this issue. These 
include papers by Chamberlin (1974, 1976), McGuire (1974), Abrams and 
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capita. Roberts suggests, however, that some measured charitable giving may actually be 
disguised private consumption. 
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Schmitz (1978), Becker (1981) Laffont (1982), Young (1982), Warr (1982, 
1983) Brennan and Pincus (1983), Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1985) Kemp 
(1984a, 1984b), and Roberts (1984). In addition, several researchers have 
conducted experiments to determine whether subjects are likely to ‘free ride’ 
in an environment where pure public goods are supplied voluntarily. Among 
those who have contributed experimental evidence are Smith (1980) Marwell 
and Ames (1981) Isaac, McCue and Plott (1982) and Kim and Walker 
(1984). Kim and Walker report on the results of several other related 
experimental tests and offer an interesting theoretical explanation of appa- 
rently contradictory findings among these studies. 
Most of the theoretical and experimental work mentioned above has 
concerned models in which a single pure public good is supplied. Each 
consumer’s preferences are assumed to depend on his private consumption 
and the sum of everyone’s voluntary contributions. The theoretical papers 
have for the most part deal with ‘Nash equilibrium’ in which each consumer 
assumes that the contributions of others will be independent of his own. The 
experimental papers have been concerned with the question of whether 
behavior is consistent with the Nash hypothesis. Sugden (1982) argues that 
the predictions of the Nash equilibrium model with a pure public good seem 
inconsistent with empirical examples of charities to which there are many 
donors2 Cornes and Sandler (1984) Steinberg (1984), and Andreoni (1985) 
treat a model in which a consumer’s utility depends not only on the 
aggregate amount of contributions, but also on his own contribution. We 
agree with these authors that a complete descriptive model of charitable 
contributions should allow each consumer to be concerned about his own 
contribution as well as the aggregate supply of the public good. Even where 
the good supplied is a pure public good and where the contributions of 
different individuals are perfect substitutes from a“technica1 standpoint, a 
fully satisfactory model should probably accommodate preferences of people 
who feel a ‘warm glow’ from having ‘done their bit’. Furthermore, in many 
instances of voluntarily supplied public goods, the contributions of indivi- 
duals are public information. Those who desire the good opinion of their 
neighbors may believe the size of their own contributions to have an 
importance beyond their effect on total supply. 
Despite our interest in a more general model we confine our attention in 
this paper to the case where people are concerned only about their private 
consumptions and the total supply of public goods. This is the model which 
has received the most attention so far in the literature and is, we suspect, the 
one on which many economists base their intuitions. The equilibrium theory 
for this polar case is strikingly clean and decisive, yet contains some 
2He suggests abandoning the hypothesis of utility maximization in favor of an ethically based 
rule of behavior. 
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interesting surprises. A thorough understanding of this case is, we think, a 
natural step on the way to a general theory. 
Warr (1983) discovered a striking result concerning the provision of a 
public good in a voluntary Nash equilibrium:3 
When a single p;blic good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its 
provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income. This holds regardless of differences 
in individual preferences and despite differences in marginal propensities to contribute to 
the public good. 
As Warr acknowledges, his proof depends on calculus first-order con- 
ditions, and therefore applies only to a redistribution of income among 
current contributors which does not alter the composition of the contributing 
set. As Warr also remarks, his result is seriously limited in its applications 
because it only deals with the case of a single public good. However, Kemp 
(1984a) suggests a way to extend Warr’s results to the case of more than one 
public good. In section 2 of this paper we sharpen and generalize Warr’s 
neutrality theorem. In section 6 we improve on Kemp’s neutrality result for 
the case of multiple public goods. 
Interesting though it is, the importance of the neutrality theorem should 
not be overstated. Income redistribution among contributors will not change 
the supply of a public good if it does not change the set of contributing 
consumers. But, as we will show, many of the interesting applications involve 
income redistribution that changes the set of contributing consumers and/or 
alters the wealth of the current set of contributing consumers. 
The message that emerges from our study is that adjustments on the 
‘extensive margin’ ~ the decision of whether or not to become a contributor - 
are at least as important as adjustments on the ‘intensive margin’ - the 
decision of how much to contribute. In general, only a small subset of 
consumers will actually contribute to the public good, and changes in the 
wealth distribution will only have a significant effect on the provision of the 
public good if they change the composition of this contributing set. Thus, the 
usual practice of assuming interior solutions in doing comparative statics is, 
in this case, quite misleading. An appropriate analysis must involve careful 
consideration of the boundary cases as well. 
However, that analysis turns out to be possible, and indeed it yields quite 
strong results. We can use this analysis to illustrated the workings of our 
model in some interesting special cases. For example, we use our results to 
analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good will 
‘crowd out’ private contributions and to demonstrate that ‘equalizing’ income 
redistributions tend to reduce the voluntary provision of a public good. Our 
neutrality theorems and other comparative static results provide a number of 
3Related insights are to be found in Becker (1981), Sugden (1982), and Cornes and Sandier 
(1985). 
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testable implications of the Nash hypothesis concerning the voluntary 
provision of public goods. This should help economists to develop new methods 
using both experimental methods and traditional empirical data to test’ the 
Nash hypothesis. 
2. A neutrality theorem 
Consider a simple model where there is one public good, one private good, 
and n consumers. Each consumer i consumes an amount xi of the private 
good and donates an amount gi 20 to the supply of the public good. The 
total supply of public good, G, is just the sum of the gifts of all individuals. 
The utility function of consumer i is ui(xi, G). Consumer i is endowed with 
wealth wi which he allocates between the private good xi and his gift g,. We 
let G_i denote the sum of all gifts by consumers other than i and make the 
Nash assumption that each consumer believes that the contributions of 
others are independent of his own. 
Definition A Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of gifts (g:), 
i=l,... ,n, such that for each i, (x:,gT) solves 




Let us consider the maximization problem of a given consumer. Implicitly 
each consumer is choosing not only his gift, but in fact the equilibrium level 
of G itself. For a consumer can decide to make a zero gift, in which case he 
chooses G = GPi, or he can choose to make G larger than GPi. Thus, the 
consumer’s maximization problem can also be written as 
max ui(xi, G) 
x,. G 
S.t. Xi+G=Wi+G*, 
This is just like an ordinary consumer choice problem except for the 
inequality constraint. We depict the equilibrium for a contributing consumer 
i in a standard consumer theory diagram in fig. 1. The budget constraint 
requires him to choose a point on the line AD while the inequality constraint 









Fig. 1. Negative wealth transfer to consumer i. 
restricts him to the segment AB of that line. Fig. 3 depicts a case with three 
different consumers who all have the same preferences but different wealth 
levels. In the example depicted there, the two wealthiest consumers are 
contributors, while the third consumer chooses not to contribute. 
Using a direct proof which fully describes the effect of an income redistri- 
bution on individual contributions, we are able to place exact boundaries on 
the class of redistributions that leave the set of contributors unchanged.4 
Because of its directness, this proof allows us to see the intuition behind the 
theorem in a way that Warr’s calculus proof does not. 
Theorem I. Assume that consumers have convex preferences and that contri- 
butions are originally in a Nash equilibrium. Consider a redistribution of 
income among contributing consumers such that no consumer loses more income 
than his original contribution. After the redistribution there is a new Nash 
equilibrium in which every consumer changes the amount of his gtft by precisely 
the change in his income. In this new equilibrium, each consumer consumes the 
same amount of the public good and the private good that he did before the 
redistribution. 
Proof Suppose that in the original equilibrium G* is the total amount of 
contributions, g: is consumer i’s contribution, and Awi is the change in i’s 
wealth caused by the redistribution. Suppose also that after the redistri- 
bution, every consumer other than consumer i changes his contribution by 
the exact amount of his change in wealth. Since the changes in wealth of all 
contributors add to zero, the total change in the contributions of others will 
‘%ornes and Sandler (1985) use a similar type of proof 
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equal minus the change in consumer i’s wealth. Therefore the budget 
equation for consumer i does not change. However, the inequality requiring 
that gifts are non-negative becomes G 2 GFi - dwi, rather than G 2 G?, as in 
the old equilibrium. Since, by assumption, g: + d wi 20, the consumer can 
still obtain the old level G* of the public good and his old level of private 
consumption by simply changing his gift to g: + Awi. 
In fact, this is the best that he can do. We see this by considering two 
possible cases. If Aw,<O, then his budget set is smaller than it was before the 
redistribution. This situation is depicted in fig. 1, where the new budget set is 
the line segment AC. Since he can still afford the old bundle, he will, by the 
principle of revealed preference, choose it. The other possibility is that 
Aw,>O. In this case the inequality constraint allows the consumer a larger 
segment of the budget line. The situation is as depicted in fig. 2, where the 
choice set is expanded from the line segment AC to the line segment AB. 
Although the budget set is larger, if the consumer has convex preferences, the 
old bundle is at least as good as any of the new possibilities made available 
to him. This is true because if there were a better choice for him in the new 
segment, then there would have to be a convex combination of this preferred 
choice and the old choice which would be better than the old choice and 
attainable in the old situation. 5 This establishes the theorem since we have 
shown that each consumer will choose to change his contribution by the 
change in his income if all other consumers do so. Q.E.D. 
Note that in the new equilibrium each consumer has precisely the same 
consumption of the private and the. public good as he had before. The 
public good 
D private good 
Fig. 2. Positive wealth transfer to consumer i. 
‘Notice that the convexity assumption is needed, since otherwise fig. 2 could be redrawn so 
that the new situation allows a choice preferred to the old choice. 
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optimal responses of the consumers to the wealth transfer have completely 
offset the effects of the redistribution. 
Before we turn to other comparative statics results, let us mention a few 
extensions of this result. First, there is no loss of generality in restricting 
ourselves to a public good which is a sum of the individual contributions. If 
instead G=f(xy= 1 g,), utility would take the form ui(xi,f(G)) which is still 
of the appropriate form. One slight extension of this form that is of 
particular interest is the form ui(xi +f;(G)). This sort of structure might be 
appropriate for modelling lobbying behavior: each agent contributes some 
amount gi to a lobbying fund which will then result in a payment to him 
of L(G). 
Secondly, it is possible to extend the result to more general solution 
concepts than that of Nash equilibrium. Suppose, for example, that each 
individual believes that when he decides to increase his gift by some amount 
dg, he induces the other agents to change their aggregate contributions by 
dG_,. Furthermore, we will suppose that this ‘conjectural variation’ of 




Then the first-order condition for the optimal gift by agent i is simply: 
- auik; G, + auiF; G, (1 + hi&, G)) = 0. 
1 
Now simply note that if each contributor changes his contribution by the 
amount of his wealth change dwi, this equation will still be satisfied, since 
neither xi or G will change. 
Furthermore, the neutrality result does not depend on there being only 
one public good. A similar argument establishes a neutrality result for the 
case of multiple public goods, as we show in Theorem 7. 
However, the result is sensitive to the assumption that utility depends only 
on private consumption and the amount of the public good. If utility also 
depended on the amount of agent i’s gift for example, the result would not 
go through in general, although it does work for some special forms of 
utility. For example, if the preferences between xi, gi, and G were quasi- 
homothetic the equilibrium demand for gi would have the form gi= ai 
+b(G)Wi. It is easy to see that Warr’s neutrality result will still obtain. 
However, the quasihomothetic preference structure is quite restrictive. 
Whether there are less restrictive preference structures that give rise to the 
same neutrality result is an open question, although the results of Bergstrom 
and Varian (1984) indicate that the linearity of demand in wealth is certainly 
a necessary condition. 
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3. Existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics 
The neutrality result in the previous section only applies when the 
redistribution of wealth is sufficiently small so as not to change the set of 
contributors. But in many interesting examples one cares about redistri- 
butions of arbitrary size, and the change in the set of contributors is of 
significant interest. 
In order to study the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in 
voluntary contributions and to develop some comparative statics results for 
arbitrary redistributions, we find it useful to study Nash ‘reaction functions’. 
Suppose that the contributions of others add up to Gmi. From our remarks 
in the previous section it follows that consumer i will choose his own 
contribution gi so that G = Gmi +gi solves the following constrained maxi- 
mization problem: 
max ui(xi, G) 
X,,G 
s.t. xi+G=wi+G*i 
Ignoring the inequality constraint, this is formally the same as a standard 
demand problem for a consumer with income wi+G5,. Let J(w) be 
consumer i’s demand function for the public good, representing the value of 
G that i would choose as a function of the right-hand side of the above 
budget constraint, ignoring the inequality constraint. Then his demand for 
the public good, taking the inequality constraint into account, is simply: 
(1) 
Subtracting G _i from each side of this equation we have individual i’s 
optimal response: 
In the previous section we made no assumptions on preferences other than 
strict convexity. In this section our results depend on the following assump- 
tion on the demand functions for the public good. 
Assumption There is a single-valued demand function for the public good, 
,fi(w), which is a differentiable function of wealth. The marginal propensity to 
consume the public good is greater than zero and less than 1 so that 
0 < f;(w) < 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. 
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The assumption that the marginal propensity to consume the public good 
is between zero and one seems innocuous. It simply requires that both the 
public and the private good be normal goods for all consumers. While this 
assumption is not needed for existence, it will be needed for uniqueness and 
it greatly simplifies our later comparative statics analyses. 
Theorem 2. A Nash equilibrium exists. 
Proof: Let W = {x in R”:Os xi 5 wi for i = 1,. . . , H}. This is clearly a compact 
and convex set. The functions gi =max (h(wi + Gei) - Gpi, 0) define a con- 
tinuous function from the set W to itself. Hence, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point 
Theorem there must exist a fixed point, which is a Nash equilbrium vector of 
gifts. Q.E.D. 
Let C denote the set of consumers that are actually contributing in some 
equilibrium; i.e. gi > 0 if and only if i is in C. From eq. (1) the following useful 
result is immediate. 
Fact I. A configuration of gifts is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
G=~(w~+G_~) for i in C, (2) 
Gz-fj(wj+Gmj) for j not in C. (3) 
We can now provide a simple characterization of an equilibrium that will be 
useful for comparative statics results. 
Fact 2. There exists a real valued function F(G, C), differentiable and increas- 
ing in G, such that in a Nash equilibrium: 
(4) 
Proof: Since .jJw) is a strictly increasing function of wealth for each 
individual, it has an inverse, #i. Applying @i to each side of (2) we have: 
4i(G)=wi+G_i for iEC. 
Summing these equations and rearranging we have: 
iz4t(G)+(l-C)G=C Wi, 
isC 
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where c is the number of contributing consumers. Letting F(G, C) denote the 
left-hand side of this relationship, we have the desired equation. To show 
that F(G,C) is increasing in G, we note that since f;(w)< l,&(G)> 1. 
Differentiating F(G, C) with respect to G gives: 
iJF(G,C)/aG=x &(G)+(l-c)>c+(l-c)=l>O. 
ieC 
Hence, F(G, C) is a strictly increasing function of G. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3. There is a unique Nash equilibriuy with a unique quantity of 
public good and a unique set of contributing consutners. 
Proof Consider two Nash equilibria in which the sets of contributing 
consumers are C and C’ and the total amounts of the public good supplied 
are G and G’. Without loss of generality, assume that G’s G. Applying $i to 
both sides of (2) and (3), we see that 
for all i in C. Summing these equations and rearranging terms, we have: 
But fact 2 informs us that: 
Since F is monotone increasing in G, it follows that G’ >= G. But, by 
construction, G’ 5 G. Therefore G’= G so that the Nash equilibrium quantity 
of the public good is uniquely determined. From (3) we see that the set of 
non-contributors is uniquely determined by G. Since G’ = G, it follows that 
C’ = C. Q.E.D. 
The above analysis suggests a way to calculate an equilibrium. Start by 
choosing an arbitrary subset of consumers C. Eq. (4) has a unique solution 
G, and given G, we can solve (2) for a unique gi for i= 1,. . ., n. If (3) is 
satisfied, we are done. If not, we choose a different set C. Since there is only 
a finite number of subsets C, and, according to Theorem 3, a unique 
equilibrium exists, this procedure will eventually terminate. 
It is immediate from fact 2 that a redistribution of wealth that does not 
change the composition of the contributing set will increase, decrease, or leave 
unchanged the equilibrium amount of the public good as it increases, 
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decreases, or leaves unchanged the aggregate wealth of the contributing set. 
However, ‘large’ redistributions of wealth will typically change the compo- 
sition of the contributing set. Nevertheless, we are able to establish some 
strong comparative statics results that apply to general changes in the 
income distribution. An important tool for establishing these results is the 
following. 
Fact 3. Let (gi) and (g:)i= l,..., n be Nash equilibria given the wealth 
distributions (wi) and (w;), let C and C’ be the corresponding sets of 
contributing consumers, and let the function F(G, C) be as defined in fact 2. 
Then 
Proof: From fact 1 it follows that fi(w; + G’_ i) 2 G’ for all i in C. Therefore, 
applying 4 = f _ ‘, 
for all i in C. Summing these inequalities over all i in C, and rearranging 
terms we have: 
Since CiECg; 5 G’, it follows that 
But, according to fact 2, 
Therefore 
F(G’, C)-F(G, C)z c (w;-wi). Q.E.D. 
isC 
Theorem 4 collects a number of comparative statics results that follow 
directly from fact 3. 
Theorem 4. In a Nash equilibrium: 
(i) Any change in the wealth distribution that leaves unchanged the aggregate 
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wealth of current contributors will either increase or leave unchanged the 
equilibrium supply of public good. 
(ii) Any change in the wealth distribution that increases the aggregate wealth 
of current contributors will necessarily increase the equilibrium supply of the 
public good. 
(iii) If a redistribution of income among current contributors increases the 
equilibrium supply of the public good, then the set of contributing consumers 
after the redistribution must be a proper subset of the original set of 
contributors. 
(iv) Any simple transfer of income from another consumer to a currently 
contributing consumer will either increase or leave constant the equilibrium 
supply of the public good. 
Proof According to fact 3, if ~i,c(w~-wi)=O, then F(G’, C)zF(G, C). Since, 
according to fact 2, F(G, C) is increasing in G, it must be that G’ 2 G. This 
proves assertion (i). Similarly, it follows from fact 3 that if &c(wi-wi)>O, 
then F(G’, C) > F(G, C) and therefore G’ > G. This proves assertion (ii). 
Suppose that the income distribution (M‘;), i = 1,. . . , n, is obtained from the 
distribution (wJ, i = 1,. . , n, by a redistribution of income among the mem- 
bers of C. If G’ > G, then it follows from fact 1 that consumers who 
contributed nothing before the redistribution will contribute nothing after. 
Therefore C’ c C. If C’ = C, then the change from the income distribution (wi) 
to the distribution (wi) leaves the total income of contributors in C’ 
unchanged. Therefore according to assertion (i) it must be that G 2 G’. But 
this is impossible if G’ > G. It follows that if G’ > G, then C’ is a proper subset 
of C. This proves assertion (iii). 
Since any simple transfer of income to a current contributor from some 
other consumer (whether that consumer is a contributor or not) will either 
increase or leave constant the aggregate wealth of current contributors, 
assertion (iv) is immediate from assertions (i) and (ii). Q.E.D. 
While it is true that a transfer of wealth from non-contributors to 
contributors will increase total contributions, it is not true that a transfer of 
income from contributors to non-contributors will necessarily decrease 
contributions, since some of the non-contributors may then decide to begin 
contributing. However, Theorem 4 establishes that a transfer in the other 
direction - from non-contributors to contributors - will necessarily increase 
the supply of the public good, even zf the set of contributors changes. The 
difference between assertion (i) of Theorem 4 and the neutrality result of 
Theorem 1 is that assertion (i) applies even to redistributions in which some 
contributors may lose more income than they are currently giving. For such 
a redistribution, the total amount of gifts may increase even though total 
income of the original set of consumers is constant and no new contributors 
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are added. But, as assertion (iii) maintains, this will occur only if the 
redistribution reduces the size of the set of contributing consumers. 
4. Equilibrium with identical tastes 
Equilibrium is even more simply characterized if all consumers have the 
same demand function for the public good. In this case there is some critical 
wealth level such that consumers with wealth greater than that level are 
contributors, and consumers with wealth less than that level are not 
contributors. Furthermore, we can show that when consumers are identical, 
the more equal the wealth distribution, the less of the public good will be 
supplied. To make this result precise, we need the following definition. 
Definition. A redistribution of wealth is said to be equalizing if it is 
equivalent to a series of bilateral transfers in which the absolute value of the 
wealth difference between the two parties to the transfer is reduced. 
Let f( .) be the demand function, which is identical for all consumers, and 
let &J( .) be the inverse function of f( .). Then we have the following useful 
characterization of equilibrium. 
Fact 4. If all consumers have identical preferences and G* is an equilibrium 
supply of the public good, then there is a critical wealth level w* = &G*) - G* 
such that all consumers with wealth wiz w* contribute nothing and every 
consumer with income wi> w* contributes the amounts gz = wi- w* to the 
supply of the public good. 
Proof. In equilibrium, according to fact 1, for all i, f (wi+G5,)5G* with 
equality if g* > 0. Therefore 
Wi + G? i 5 4(G*) with equality if gf > 0. 
But G?, = G* -gT, so that we can rewrite the previous inequality as 
Wi-g: 5 $J(G*) - G* with equality if g* > 0. 
Let w* =&G*) - G*. Then the previous inequality implies that: 
gi*=wi-w* if wi>wT and gT=O ifwizw*. Q.E.D. 
Armed with fact 4, we can demonstrate the following additional properties 
of equilibrium. 
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Theorem 5. If preferences are identical, then in a Nash equilibrium: 
(i) All contributors will have greater wealth than all non-contributors. 
(ii) All contributors will consume the same amount of the private good as 
well as of the public good. 
(iii) An equalizing wealth redistribution will never increase the voluntary 
equilibrium supply of the public good. 
(iv) Equalizing wealth redistributions among current non-contributors or 
among current contributors will leave the equilibrium supply unchanged. 
(v) Equalizing income redistributions that involve any tranSfers from con- 
tributors to non-contributors will decrease the equilibrium supply of the public 
good. 
Proof. Assertions (i) and (ii) are immediate from fact 4. To prove assertion 
(iv), let G* be the initial equilibrium supply and let w* =+(G*)-G*. An 
equalizing wealth redistribution between two consumers with wealths smaller 
than w* will leave them both with wealths below w* after the transfer. 
Therefore G* will remain an equilibrium with the same set of contributors as 
in the initial equilibrium. An equalizing wealth redistribution between two 
consumers with wealths at least as large as w* will leave them both with 
wealths at least as large as w*. It follows from fact 4 that neither consumer 
loses more wealth than his contributions in the initial equilibrium. Therefore 
it follows from Theorem 1 that G* remains an equilibrium. Since all 
equalizing distributions that do not involve a transfer from a contributing 
consumer to a non-contributing consumer must be made up of a sequence of 
transfers of this type, redistributions of this type will leave the equilibrium 
supply unchanged. 
To prove assertion (v), consider an equalizing redistribution between two 
consumers in which wealth is distributed from some consumer i with wi > w* 
to a consumer j with wj < w*. In this case we claim that equilibrium provision 
of the public good must fall. For suppose the new equilibrium provision is 
G 2 G*. Then the new threshold income is w’=@(G)-G’ and w’zw*. From 
fact 4 it then follows that those consumers whose wealths did not change 
would not increase but might decrease their contributions. Let d be the 
amount of wealth that is transferred from i to j. If Wi - d > W’ and Wj + d > w’, 
then from fact 4 and the fact that w’>= w* it follows that consumer i will 
diminish his contribution by at least d and consumer j will increase his 
contribution by less than d. If after the redistribution only one of the two 
consumers i and j has income greater than w’, then let w+ be the larger of w; 
and w>. Then the total contributions of i and j after the redistribution will be 
W+ -w’. Since the redistribution was an equalizing redistribution, it must be 
that w+ < wi. Therefore wf -w’ < wi - w*. But total contributions by i and j 
before the redistribution were just wi- w*. It follows that for all bilateral 
redistributions from a contributor i to a non-contributor j, total contri- 
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butions of i and j will diminish while contributions of all other consumers 
will not increase. Therefore total contributions must decrease. But this 
implies that G’< G*, which is contrary to our hypothesis that G’z G*. Since 
any equalizing transfer that involves a transfer from some contributor to 
some non-contributor can be constructed as a series of bilateral transfers of 
this type of the type covered in assertion (iv), we have a proof of assertion 
(v). Assertion (iii) is immediate from (iv) and (v). Q.E.D. 
The surprising result that all contributors have the same public and 
private consumption also has a simple geometric proof. Consider fig. 3, and 
assume that all consumers have identical preferences so that the indifference 
curves depicted there come from a single preference ordering. Suppose, as 
shown, that agents 2 and 3 have different wealths and different private 
consumption. Then increasing agent 2’s wealth to the level of agent 1 would 
result in no change in the demand for the public good G, violating our 
assumption of strict normality. This contradiction establishes the result. 
Theorem 5 can be extended in the following way to an economy in which 
preferences are not identical. Suppose that there are a number of different 
‘types’ of consumers. With minor modifications of our proof, we can 
demonstrate that all consumers of the same type who contribute to the 
public good must have the same private consumption. Where an ‘equalizing 
redistribution’ is defined as one which consists of a series of equalizing 
transfers between consumers of the same type, we can also show that the 
conclusions of Theorem 5 hold. 
public good 
private good 
Fig. 3. A typical Nash equilibrium. 
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If preferences are homothetic as well as identical, we can describe 
equilibrium even more explicitly. In this case the demand functions have the 
special form f(w) = c(w. Let us order the consumers so that w1 2 w2 2 .. 2 w,. 
One possible equilibrium would have the richest person be the sole con- 
tributor. Then his contributions would be f(wl)=ctwl. The second wealthiest 
person will not contribute if 
which reduces to 
(l-a)w,Zw, 
Thus, if c(=O.5, and the richest individual is more than twice as wealthy as 
the second richest, he will be the only contributor to the public good. 
Another interesting case is where the wealthiest individual has all of the 
wealth W and everyone else has zero wealth. In this case the wealthiest 
individual chooses G, =crW which is easily seen to be a Pareto-efficient level 
of the public good. Now divide his wealth between two individuals. Theorem 
5 implies that they must both be equal contributors to the public good since 
they have the same wealth. Therefore 
G, = a( W/2 + G,/2), 
or equivalently, 
G, = cx W/(2 - ci), 
which is strictly less than G, since CI is less than 1. More generally, if all 
wealth is divided equally among the k consumers, we have: 
G, = c( W/(k - a), 
so the level of the public good diminishes as the income distribution becomes 
more equal. The smallest amount of the public good is supplied when 
everyone is a contributor. 
A further case where one can get explicit solutions is the case of 
quasilinear utility, i.e. where the utility function has the form: 
~i(xi, G) =xi + hi(G). 
Let us take the particular example of 
ui(xi, G) = xi + ui In G. 
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There are two interesting cases. First, suppose that a, = 1 for all i = 1,. . . , JI. It 
is possible to show that any set of gifts (gi), i = 1,. . . , n, such that Osgi 5 1 
and I:= i gi = 1 is an equilibrium.6 
Now suppose that ai = 1 and a, < 1 for i = 2,. . . , n. In this case the unique 
equilibrium is g, = G = 1 and gi = 0 for i = 2,. . . n. In this equilibrium person 1 
contributes the entire amount of the public good, and all the other agents 
free ride! Thus, a very small change in the preference can lead to a large 
change in the structure of the equilibrium. This example shows how special 
the case of symmetric equilibria is when free rider problems are present. 
5. The effect of government supply on private donations 
Suppose that the government provides some quantity of public goods 
which it pays for with tax revenues. Could it be that the government 
provision ‘crowds out’ an equal amount of private donations? Abrams and 
Schmitz (1978) pose this question and attempt to answer it empirically. 
Using time series data for the United States, they regress private charitable 
donations on government expenditures on health, hospitals, education, and 
welfare. Their estimates ‘indicate a crowding out effect on the order of 28 per 
cent. This implies that a one dollar increase in governmental transfers lowers 
private charitable contributions by approximately 28 cents’. Roberts (1984) 
cites historical evidence that the introduction of large-scale government 
welfare programs in the United States was accompanied by a reduction in 
private charitable contributions. Roberts’ figures also show that the total 
amount of relief funds, private and public, rose during this period. In the 
context of a somewhat different model, Brennan and Pincus (1983) suggest 
that when public expenditures are supplemented by private contributions, 
small increases in public contributions are likely to displace equal amounts 
of private contributions. 
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) present theoretical analyses which yield 
the rather startling result that government contributions result in a ‘dollar 
for dollar’ reduction in private contributions. Their results rely on the 
assumption that all of the taxes that pay for the government’s contribution 
are collected from contributors. Typically, we would argue, that in equili- 
brium, the set of contributing consumers is only a small subset of the 
taxpaying population. Therefore the extra taxes paid by contributing con- 
sumers are likely to be much less than the government’s contribution. 
Theorem 6 shows that under these circumstances the crowding out effect of 
government contributions will be only partial. 
6Note that this example does not violate our uniqueness result since G is not a strictly normal 
good when utility is quasilinear. 
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Theorem 6. Suppose that starting from an initial position where consumers 
supply a public good voluntarily, the government supplies some amount of the 
public good which it pays for from ttr~~\. T/WI: 
(i) If the taxes collected from each inrlic~id~~trl do not ex.ceed his voluntary 
contribution to the public good in the absence of government supply, then the 
government’s contribution results in an equal reduction in the amount of private 
contributions. 
(ii) If the government collects some of the taxes that pay for its contribution 
from non-contributors, then, although private contributions may decrease, the 
equilibrium total supply of the public good must increase. 
(iii) If the government collects some of the taxes that pay for its contribution 
by taxing any contributor by more than the amount of his contribution, the 
equilibrium total supply of the public good must increase. 
Proof. Suppose that the government collects taxes ti from each consumer i 
and supplies an amount g, of the public good, where c;=l ti=g,. The total 
amount of the public good supplied will be G =g, + EYE 1 gi. Let G_, = 
G-g,. The budget constraint of consumer i can be written xi +gi= wi- ti 
or, equivalently, .\, + G = wi - ti + GPi. By the same reasoning that established 
fact 2, we see that in Nash equilibrium it must be that conditions (2) and (3) 
apply in this model as well. Defining the function $i as in the proof of fact 2, 
we have, as before, in Nash equilibrium, $i(G) = wi- ti + G_i for all i in C. 
Summing these equations over all i in C, we find: 
F(G,C)= C Wi- 1 ti+gos 
isC isC 
where F(G, C) is defined as in fact 2. Therefore government provision of the 
public good has exactly the same effect as a wealth transfer in which the 
total wealth of the set of contributing consumers is changed by go-~iecti. If 
all consumers are contributors, then the taxes collected from contributors 
must necessarily equal the total government contributions so that go-Citcti 
=O. From Theorem 1 it then follows that the equilibrium supply of the 
public good remains constant despite the government provision of the good. 
This proves assertion (i). But if the government collects some taxes from non- 
contributors, then go-_ciEc i t >O. This is then equivalent to a transfer that 
increases the wealth of the set of contributors, which, by part (ii) of Theorem 
4, must increase the equilibrium supply of the public good. This proves 
assertion (ii). 
To prove part (iii), we suppose that some consumer is taxed by more than 
his voluntary contribution. Think of this as first taxing the consumer by the 
exact amount of his contribution, then taxing him for the extra amount. The 
first step leaves the amount of the public good unchanged by assertion (i), 
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and the second step increases the amount of the public good by assertion 
(ii). Q.E.D. 
Our Theorem 6 is certainly consistent with the findings of Abrams and 
Schmitz and of Roberts that there is ‘partial crowding out’. However, it 
would be interesting to extend the empirical explorations begun by these 
authors to try to determine whether some of the reduction in private 
donations which they attribute to crowding out by public expenditures can 
be explained by a reduction in income inequality. It would also be interesting 
to look at cross-section data across different countries or localities in 
addition to the single country time series that they have examined. Theorems 
5 and 6 also pose a number of strong testable hypotheses that could be 
investigated by experimental economists who could, for example, impose 
identical payoff functions, or could introduce entirely exogenous changes in 
the amount of public goods supplied and taxes collected by a ‘government’. 
Brennan and Pincus (1983) suggest that much of the growth of govern- 
ment expenditures in industrialized countries in the twentieth century must 
be accounted for, not by an increase in demand for public goods, but rather 
by the fact that government provision of goods crowds out private 
expenditures on the same goods so that the ‘effects of enormous increases 
in government spending on the aggregate pattern of consumption in the 
economy . . . are probably quite small’. This argument is buttressed by the 
empirical work of Borcherding (1977), who shows that in the United States 
in the twentieth century, state and local government expenditures have risen 
much more rapidly than can be explained by changes in income, price, and 
other standard economic variables. 
It would be nice to have an explanation not only of what happens to 
private contributions when the government increases its contribution of a 
public good, but also of what causes the government to do so. Our results 
offer a clue that may provide a partial explanation for the historical increase 
in government’s role. In the model that we treat, private contributions will in 
general supply less than a Pareto-optimal amount of public goods. On the 
other hand, we have not incorporated the inefficiencies of administration, the 
informational imperfections inherent in demoncratic decision-making, and 
the excess burden involved in collecting taxes. These effects, if properly 
accounted for, could suggest good reasons why private rather than public 
provision would sometimes be efficient. As Theorem 5 indicates, the amount 
supplied by voluntary contributions will tend to be smaller the more equally 
income is distributed. Thus, if an economy evolves toward a more equal 
distribution of income we can expect the amount of public goods that would 
be provided voluntarily to diminish. This means that the case for government 
provision in the interest of efficiency would become stronger as the income 
distribution becomes more equal and might eventually overcome the advan- 
tages of private provision. 
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6. An extension to several public goods 
Theorem 1 generalizes in an interesting way to the case of several public 
goods. Let us suppose that in equilibrium any consumer can contribute any 
non-negative amount that he chooses to the supply of any of the public 
goods. For economy of exposition, we will confine our formal discussion to 
the case of two public goods, G and H. All of our discussion extends in a 
fairly obvious way to higher dimensions. For the purposes of this section we 
define a Nash equilibrium as follows. 
Definition. A Nash equilibrium is a vector of gifts (g:) and (AT), i = 1,. , II, 
such that for each i, (g:,h:) maximizes 
subject to the constraints: 
g,zO and h,ZO. 
The existence of such a Nash equilibrium is a simple generalization of 
Theorem 2. Now if the sets of donors to the two public goods are disjoint, 
we can use exactly the same argument that we gave in theorem 1 to establish 
a neutrality result - we can redistribute wealth among the G contributors or 
among the H contributors and we will get exactly the same kind of neutrality 
theorem. However, if the two sets of contributors are not disjoint, we may 
have difficulties. For in this case, redistributing wealth among the con- 
tributors to G may change the wealth of the some of the contributors to H. 
This in turn may change their contributions to H and thus change the 
equilibrium. As it turns out, we are able to show that if an income 
distribution among contributors leaves aggregate income of contributors to 
H and of contributors to G constant, then equilibrium total contributions are 
unchanged for each public good. 
It is convenient to make the following definitions. Let GDONORS and 
HDONORS indicate the set of consumers who contribute to G and H, 
respectively, and let GONLY and HONLY be the consumers that contribute 
only to G and only to H. Let BOTH be the set of consumers that contribute 
positive amounts to both public goods, and DONORS the set of consumers 
that contribute positive amounts to either public good. The restriction that a 
redistribution among contributors leaves total income of contributors to G 
and of contributors to H constant is expressed as the following. 
7: Bergstrom et al., Private provision of public goods 45 
Assumption A. The wealth redistribution among the donors satisfies: 
c Awi= c Awi= 1 Aw,=O. 
itGDONORS io HDONORS isDONORS 
Although the following assumption may seem stronger, it is actually 
equivalent to Assumption A. 
Assumption B. The wealth redistribution among the donors satisfies: 
c Aw,= c Awi= c Awi= c Awi=O. 
IsGONLY ieHONLY i.zBOTH itDONORS 
The proof that these assumptions are equivalent is a simple exercise in 
addition. We can now prove the following neutrality theorem. 
Theorem 7. Let ui(xi,G,H) be continuous and quasiconcave, and let 
(xT,gT, h:), for i= 1,. ., n, be a Nash equilibrium. Let (Aw,), i= 1,. . . ,n, be a 
wealth transfer satisfying Assumption A or B and 
g:+h*+Aw,>O for iEDONORS. 
Then after the redistribution there is a Nash equilibrium in which the total 
supply of each public good and the private consumption of each consumer is the 
same as before the redistribution. 
Proof. The argument is similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 1. Let 
us indicate the initial equilibrium by (G*,H*). Given the wealth transfer 
(An*;) we can assume that each consumer in GONLY changes his contri- 
bution by Agi=Awi, each consumer in HONLY changes his contribution by 
Ah, = Awi, and that the consumers in BOTH change their contributions in 
the following way: 
Ag,= G;or~~~;or~ (gT +hF + Awi) =g*> 
Ah,= G~of~~~zor,, (gT+hT+AwJ-h:, 
where G~o,,=~ieBOTHg~ and H,*,,, is defined in a similar manner. 
This is clearly feasible, so we only need show that it is optimal for each 
consumer if the amount given by the others is (G%i-Agi,HEi-Ahi). 
Suppose not. Then there exists some new choice (xj,gi,hi) that consumer i 
prefers to the choice (x,*,gT + Ag,, hi* + Ahi) and that is feasible for him. In 
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symbols: 
Ui(XI,gli+ G*i-Agi, k~+H*i-Ah,) 
>ui(X*,g:+Agi+G*i-Agi,ki*+Aki+H*-Ahi). 
Since both the preferences and the budget set are convex, we can suppose 
that (xi,g:, hi) is arbitrarily close to (xT,gT + dg,, kr +Aki). If this is so, then 
gi+dwi>O for those consumers giving to G and kj+Aw,>O for those 
consumers giving to H. But then the choice (x;,g:-_g,, hi- Ah,) would be 
feasible under the consumer’s original budget constraint and rearranging the 
above inequality shows that it would be preferred to his original choice since: 
This contradiction establishes the result. Q.E.D. 
Kemp (1984) proposes an extension of Warr’s neutrality theorem to the 
case of several public goods. He argues, by counting equations and un- 
knowns in the calculus first-order conditions, that if all consumers are 
making positive voluntary contributions to the supply of all public goods, 
then a small redistribution of income will have no effect on either the 
equilibrium supply of public goods or on any individual’s consumption. 
Kemp’s theorem shares with Warr’s results the usual perils of assertions 
about the existence of a unique equilibrium on the grounds of equality of the 
numbers of equations and unknowns. ’ A second weakness is that the Kemp 
proof makes essential use of the assumption that all consumers voluntarily 
contribute positive amounts of all public goods. This is a very strong 
assumption even if there is only one public good.8 In general we would 
expect that if consumers do not have identical preferences and incomes, it 
would be an extreme accident to find an equilibrium in which the set of 
contributors was the same for all public goods. 
We are able to prove a theorem that does not require that everyone 
contributes to all public goods, but the result applies only to those 
redistributions that leave the total wealth of contributors to each public good 
unchanged, as well as leaving the total wealth constant for those who 
contribute to hotk public goods. Of course a special case would be Kemp’s 
‘These are particularly treacherous when inequality constraints are lurking. In fairness, we 
must emphasize that both Warr and Kemp qualify their statements appropriately. 
‘Warr’s theorem, although based on first-order conditions, does not require that all 
consumers contribute positive amounts, only that the redistribution be solely among con- 
tributors. This escape is not available for Kemp’s theorem in its current form since the normal 
case would seem to be where some people contribute to one of the goods and not to the other. 
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case of a redistribution among all consumers where all consumers contribute 
to every public good. Where the quantity of one public good affects the 
demand for the other public good it is easy to see why some such restriction 
is needed. For example, if the sets of contributors to G and H are neither 
disjoint nor identical, then some redistributions of income among con- 
tributors to G may increase total income of contributors to H resulting in an 
increased supply of H and consequent feedback on contributions to G. 
Theorem 7 can be extended to the case of more than two public goods, 
where the class of income redistributions considered is such that for every 
subset of the set of all public goods, aggregate income is constant for the set 
of consumers who contribute positive amounts to these goods and nothing to 
any other public goods. In general, if there are many public goods, this is a 
very restrictive condition. However, in many applications, there is special 
structure such as the sets of contributors to certain public goods being 
identical or disjoint which makes this restriction quite natural. 
7. Further applications 
Extending our results to the case of several public goods allows a number 
of interesting applications. One application, suggested by the work of Arrow 
(1981) and Becker (1981), concerns the case of voluntary income redistri- 
bution. If some people are altruistically concerned about the consumptions of 
others, we can model the consumption of each individual in whom others are 
interested as a pure public good. (There is no loss of generality in doing so 
even if some consumers are totally uninterested in this individual’s consump- 
tion, since the theory of public goods remains intact although some of the 
public goods may enter some utility functions in a trivial way.) If the 
population can be partitioned into ‘families’ in such a way that all 
contributors to any individual are in his own family, then Theorem 7 could 
be applied to redistributions of income within families. 
Another example is the case of two rival political parties. Suppose that the 
probability that either party achieves oflice depends positively on the total 
amount of campaign contributions that it receives and negatively on the total 
amount of contributions that its rival receives. Contributions to both parties 
can be treated as ‘pure public goods’, where adherents of either party regard 
contributions to their own party as desirable and contributions to the other 
party as undesirable. In this model, one’s willingness to contribute to his own 
party depends both on the sum of contributions to his own party and on the 
sum of contributions to the other party. Theorem 7 informs us that a small 
redistribution of income among contributors to either party will not change 
total contributions either to that party or to its rival. 
Yet a third application is to the macroeconomic ‘neutrality’ literature 
initiated by Barro (1974). Bernheim and Bagwell (1984) provide a very 
general treatment of redistributive neutrality in this context, both across and 
within generations. However, they, along with the others who have written in 
this area, examine only the interior case - where every agent is contributing 
a positive amount to his descendants. The results presented earlier in this 
paper suggest that the analysis of the ‘boundary case’, where some agents are 
not contributing, may well be tractable. Furthermore, we would conjecture 
that when such boundary cases occur there will be significant non- 
neutralities of the sort we have found for our problem. The decision of 
whether or not to contribute - to a public good, or to one’s descendants - is 
an endogenous one, and the adjustment on the ‘extensive margin’ is at least 
as important as the adjustment on the ‘intensive margin’. 
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